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China-Myanmar diplomatic relations, established in 1950, have now reached their 76th anniversary. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on June 8, 1950, and the term “pauk-phaw” (fraternal relations) has been used to express the close ties between their leaders and peoples. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were signed by the prime ministers of the two countries in 1954.

China-Myanmar relations have deep historical roots and are also highly significant in terms of politics, economics, security and regional geopolitics. Myanmar is strategically important to China, while China has substantial economic interests in Myanmar.

China is currently one of the world's major superpowers and one of the strongest economies globally.

Therefore, relations with China are important for Myanmar, its neighbouring country, and Myanmar is in a position where it cannot afford to distance itself from China. Myanmar must also handle its relations with China carefully, a necessity that cannot be avoided.

Why? Even Canada's and Mexico's relations with the United States, a global superpower and their neighbour, require careful management. If they fail to pay sufficient attention to these relations, smaller neighbouring countries could face difficulties at any time because of the power of the United States.

Likewise, Myanmar must exercise caution in its engagement with Russia, the United States and Western countries if it intends to develop relations with them that go beyond those with China. This is because...

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In today's world, major powers often compete militarily and economically in other countries rather than on their own territory, turning such conflicts into proxy wars. Current proxy wars around the world demonstrate that these major powers are driven by the benefits and interests they expect to gain from the countries in which the conflicts take place.

In recent years, major powers have been involved on opposing sides in conflicts including the Israel-Hamas war, the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Iran war, as well as wars in Libya, Syria and other parts of the Middle East.

Similarly, in Myanmar, the Three Brotherhood Alliance in the north — the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA) — took the lead in launching Operation 1027 in northern Shan State on October 27, 2023.

There have been assessments that the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a powerful armed group widely viewed as having Chinese backing, was involved in the operation indirectly or throu gh other means. These assessments were said to have been borne out when China later exerted pressure on the Wa group. Reports subsequently stated that the Wa group could no longer provide any assistance to the MNDAA or allow it to pass through its territory. These developments have been cited as undeniable evidence.

Critics have argued that Operation 1027, conducted by the MNDAA and other ethnic armed groups, was undertaken solely to serve the interests of each group. On the ground, the Kokang and Ta'ang groups were also seen as having encroached on territories beyond their own areas.

The 2008 Constitution had already designated Kokang and Ta'ang areas as self-administered zones. However, the Kokang and Ta'ang groups took up arms and seized territories that were not part of their designated areas.

Political researchers have also viewed the military operations of these groups as a proxy war by China against Myanmar. Operation 1027, conducted by the China-influenced MNDAA and TNLA, came to a halt only after China imposed strong pressure and coercive measures on the groups. This has further reinforced perceptions that the two groups are directly or indirectly under Chinese influence.

At the time, China exerted considerable pressure through the Wa group on the MNDAA and TNLA to stop the fighting. Subsequently, the MNDAA and TNLA each issued unilateral ceasefire announcements under Chinese pressure. China then mediated the Haigeng talks, resulting in a ceasefire agreement between Tatmadaw and the MNDAA and TNLA.

Following the fighting in northern Shan State under the name Operation 1027, the MNDAA took control of Laukkai, Kongyan, Chinshwehaw, Mongkoe, Tarmoenye, Kutkai (Pangsai), Lashio, Kunlong and Hsenwi. It designated the area as Special Region 1 and operated its own administrative system. However, Lashio was later returned to the government following China's mediation.

Similarly, during Phase One of Operation 1027, the TNLA seized Namtu, Namhsan, Namkham, Kutkai, Mantong, Monglon and Mongngawt. In Phase Two, it announced that it had taken control of townships including Nawngcho, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Mogok and Momeik. However, Mogok and Momeik were returned to the government following China's mediation.

At present, the Myanmar military has reached ceasefire agreements with both the Kokang and Ta'ang groups, and northern Shan State has remained quiet without fighting. However, the military has not yet retaken the territories seized by the Kokang and Ta'ang groups during Operation 1027. Both groups have begun implementing their own administrative systems in the territories they captured.

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The Kokang and Ta'ang groups have faced strong objections from local ethnic organizations because they have placed ethnic identity at the forefront of their administration in territories they seized.

Compared with the TNLA, the MNDAA's actions and activities have been more severe. One of the most serious actions attributed to the MNDAA was the destruction of Buddhist pagodas and religious monuments.

On January 8, 2024, an MNDAA member reportedly demolished a pagoda on Hill 2202, also known as Elephant Head Hill, in Laukkai by striking it with a hammer. On March 30, 2024, photographs circulated on Telegram showing two people wearing MNDAA uniforms standing on some Buddha images at the Lay Myet Hna Pagoda in Laukkai. These acts were also described as insulting and disrespectful to Buddhism.

That was not all. In towns under its control, the MNDAA began displaying signs in both Myanmar and Chinese, in addition to placing greater emphasis on the use of Chinese currency.

Although successive Myanmar governments had designated the town as Hsenwi, it was reportedly referred to as Mupan after it came under MNDAA control.

The Kokang group, which is among Myanmar's ethnic groups, has faced widespread objections from local ethnic communities because it has been forcibly implementing Chinese culture and customs in towns under its control.

On May 25 this year, the Shan Youth Congress issued a statement opposing the MNDAA's excessive use of armed force in territorial expansion and administrative activities in northern Shan State.

In its statement titled “Federalism and the Direction of the MNDAA,” the Shan Youth Congress highlighted administrative and land-related problems, as well as human rights and socioeconomic issues faced by local people under MNDAA administration.

The Shan Youth Congress said the MNDAA was facing administrative and land-related problems in northern Shan State, including the promotion of Kokang identity, changes to the original character of towns and villages, land confiscation and undervaluation, preferential treatment for foreign nationals, and forced extraction of natural resources.

Furthermore, on October 9 this year, eight Shan organizations sent an open letter to the MNDAA, which has been replacing local languages and administrative systems with Chinese language and Chinese-style governance in northern Shan State.

The letter addressed issues including the unilateral removal of public signs written in Shan, Ta'ang/Palaung and Myanmar languages in northern Shan townships and their replacement with Chinese signs. It also raised concerns about the imposition of external administrative models, currency systems and municipal regulations without considering local ethnic customs, traditions and self-determination.

The MNDAA’s forced implementation of Chinese-language use, Chinese signage and Chinese-style administration has been criticized as contradicting China’s own ethnic affairs policies and potentially fueling anti-China sentiment among people across Myanmar.

It also warned that Beijing, which prioritizes border stability and smooth diplomatic relations, would likely not want local administrative abuses to lead to opposition among Myanmar's people and the emergence of new conflicts.

It has also been warned that if the MNDAA continues to impose authoritarian rule in areas such as Kutkai, where different ethnic groups have long lived together, it risks becoming politically and militarily isolated. The statement further urges the group to recognize that military control of territory is only temporary and to respect the culture, languages and rights of local ethnic communities in order to ensure peaceful coexistence.

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At present, both the MNDAA and TNLA have come to Nay Pyi Taw for peace talks.

The National Solidarity and Peace Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) met with the TNLA in Nay Pyi Taw on July 19, while talks with the MNDAA took place on September 24. According to reports that emerged from these meetings, both the TNLA and MNDAA primarily demanded that they be granted their own states.

Although Section 56 of the 2008 Constitution designates self-administered regions and self-administered zones, both the TNLA and MNDAA have been demanding statehood. Let us therefore examine the populations of the self-administered areas in which the TNLA and MNDAA operate, based on the 2014 census.

According to the 2014 census, the Palaung Self-Administered Zone, designated under the Constitution and where the TNLA operates, had a population of just over 100,000. Similarly, the Kokang Self-Administered Zone, where the MNDAA operates, also had a population of just over 100,000, according to the 2014 census. It is therefore an exceedingly bold demand for ethnic armed groups with populations of this size to seek state-level status, including in territories they have seized through armed incursions.

Less than a month after the TNLA and MNDAA groups travelled to Nay Pyi Taw to demand the designation of their territories as states, China’s Special Representative for Asian Affairs, Deng Xijun, has spoken out on the issue. Deng, who replaced his predecessor Sun Guoxiang, has also visited Myanmar frequently.

Following Myanmar’s political upheaval in 2021, Deng Xijun first visited the country in December 2022. He subsequently made further visits in 2023 and 2024, during which he held a series of meetings with the then chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC), the foreign minister and other senior Myanmar government officials.

Deng has called for efforts to explore forms of enhanced autonomy for ethnic minorities in Myanmar. He made the remarks at a ceremony marking the 11th anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), held on October 15.

As China is not only Myanmar’s neighbour but also one of the world’s superpowers, political observers have questioned whether such remarks by an influential Chinese representative amount to interference in Myanmar’s sovereignty.

At a time when armed conflict is escalating and the Myanmar military has lost control of some territories in ethnic areas, Deng’s remarks have also drawn widespread criticism. Some critics argue that China is taking advantage of the current situation to advance its own interests, likening the move to spreading a mat while a commotion is underway.

In this context, although Deng Xijun’s remarks do not amount to an ultimatum like the one delivered by Colonel Sladen during the Anglo-Burmese wars, they appear to echo the demands of armed groups widely perceived to be backed by China.

Following the Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1885, the whole of Myanmar came under British rule. That year, Britain launched its third invasion of Burma, using as a pretext the Burmese king’s decision to impose a fine on the Bombay Burma Trading Corporation over allegations of illegal timber extraction. British forces subsequently conquered the entire country.

The Burmese government decided that the British timber company should pay compensation of more than 2.3 million kyats after it was found to have extracted more than 80,000 units of Burmese timber while declaring only slightly over 30,000. However, in an effort to avoid a deterioration in relations with Britain, the Burmese side waived the compensation rather than demanding payment. Despite this concession, the British dispatched Colonel Sladen to present Burma with five demands resembling an ultimatum and coercively insisted that a response be given within seven days.

Although the Burmese side accepted demands one through four, British forces launched their third invasion on November 14, 1885. On November 29, 1885, King Thibaw and Queen Supayalat were captured and deported to Ratnagiri, bringing the Third Anglo-Burmese War to an end. From that point onward, Myanmar remained under British colonial rule for more than 60 years, until gaining independence in 1948.

In the present day, northern armed groups, including the MNDAA, which is widely perceived to have China’s backing, have attacked Lashio, home to a regional military command headquarters, as well as Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Mogok, and have even threatened Mandalay. Although these developments are not directly connected to Britain’s colonization of Burma, the proxy war unfolding in Myanmar’s northeastern region is gradually creating a situation in which the country’s sovereignty and independence could be undermined or lost.

While the northern ethnic armed groups were launching offensives and seizing territories, they were simultaneously preparing for and awaiting the China-brokered Haigeng talks, scheduled to take place in Kunming on August 8, 2024. At a time when the Myanmar government side viewed participation in the talks as potentially jeopardizing the country’s sovereignty, Chinese Special Envoy Deng Xijun arrived in Myanmar unexpectedly on August 8, 2024, just as the Haigeng talks were due to take place.

At the time, it was not known precisely what message Deng Xijun had brought to Myanmar, what remarks he had made about the country, or whether he had delivered any ultimatums reminiscent of those issued by Colonel Sladen. However, subsequent developments saw agreements reached at the Haigeng talks, followed by a ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar military and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).

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A sovereign state is a country that possesses certain defining characteristics, including the exercise of sovereignty over its domestic affairs and external relations, a permanent population, a government, and the capacity to conduct relations with other sovereign states. In general, sovereignty refers to a country's independence from other states and its freedom from external control or domination.

Sovereignty is essential for governing and maintaining a country in an orderly manner and for safeguarding the interests and well-being of its people. Only by exercising sovereignty can a country advance the interests of both the nation and its citizens. Sovereignty is also one of the defining characteristics of an independent state. Sovereign power is generally divided into three branches: the executive, legislative, and judicial powers.

Although Myanmar exercises these three branches of power—the executive, legislative, and judicial—the government is currently unable to exercise them across the entire country. Just days ago, the state of emergency and martial law were extended for another 90 days in 55 townships.

The 55 townships covered by the extension include areas in Sagaing, Magway, Chin, Rakhine, Kayah, Kayin, and Shan states and regions. As a result, Myanmar's sovereignty is currently facing numerous challenges.

Only when sovereignty is preserved and firmly maintained can the desired political system be established. Without sovereignty, it is impossible to pursue the political system the country seeks to achieve.

The fighting must come to an end, and peace must be achieved. Preserving and safeguarding Myanmar's sovereignty is also an aspiration of the Myanmar people.

Regarding Myanmar’s Sovereignty, the remarks made by Deng Xijun at the 11th anniversary of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) appear to contradict China’s policy of “non-interference.” During the 1027 Operation, Deng Xijun also undermined Myanmar’s sovereignty by forcefully pushing for the Haigeng talks.

To be frank, Eleven Media shares the view that Deng Xijun has taken a highly one-sided approach in negotiations with Myanmar and has failed to promote successful China–Myanmar friendship.

Throughout Myanmar’s history since independence, armed rebellions that have threatened the country’s sovereignty have originated along the Chinese border. This is due to the territorial expansion ambitions of armed rebel groups based along the border, such as the MNDAA. During the battles and territorial seizures carried out in the 1027 Operation, some Chinese lobbyists attempted to divert attention by linking these events to the White Chinese Kuomintang forces, the island of Formosa (Taiwan), the CIA, and other factors. Ideas reflecting a servile mentality toward China, along with the statements and activities of such lobbyists, can also damage relations between China and Myanmar.

From the White Kuomintang forces, which were responsible for the first foreign incursion into Myanmar after independence, and the domestic Communist Party of Burma (CPB), to the current Three Brotherhood Alliance in northern Myanmar—the MNDAA, AA, and TNLA—armed rebellions that have threatened Myanmar’s sovereignty and could jeopardize its independence have begun operating from the Chinese border areas.

Looking at successive governments since independence, including the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the National League for Democracy (NLD), and the current government, it is the ethnic armed organizations along the Chinese border that have caused the greatest difficulties for them.

In other words, although British colonial rule was the root cause of Myanmar’s prolonged civil war, which has lasted for 80 years, the conflict has been prolonged by armed groups widely perceived as being backed by China. From China’s perspective, Myanmar is now the only country among those sharing a border with China that continues to experience armed conflict.

Looking back at history, Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai supported the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), and this support continued until 1989, during the leadership of Deng Xiaoping.

The resurgence of armed groups seeking to expand their territorial control along the Chinese border, such as the MNDAA, began in 2015, during the presidency of Xi Jinping. While armed groups in the border areas had remained relatively peaceful during Deng Xiaoping’s era, renewed rebellions began to emerge along the border after Xi Jinping came to power in 2015. China’s proxy wars in the border regions began to reappear.

At present, fighting has resumed as a result of the growing strength and territorial incursions of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. Moreover, the demands by the MNDAA and TNLA for statehood beyond the limits of the Constitution, together with Deng Xijun’s remarks advocating a model of extensive autonomy for ethnic minorities, have had the effect of undermining Myanmar’s sovereignty. Such developments are unacceptable both in terms of China–Myanmar friendship and the preservation of Myanmar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Demands for confederation that cannot realistically be achieved, alongside the territorial expansion of these proxy rebel groups, are simply untenable. Armed groups may seize cities and hold them for a year or two, but what will happen in the next 10 years, or even 100 years? The people of Myanmar will continue fighting to reclaim and preserve their sovereignty.

Leaders will change. Governments will change. Parliaments will change. However, when it comes to defending this land and its sovereignty, the people of Myanmar will fight to the very end, while the country itself will endure.

Therefore, will the MNDAA respect Myanmar’s sovereignty and, in the spirit of national unity, peacefully remain within its own territory and withdraw as soon as possible to the east of the Salween River, like the powerful ethnic armed organizations along the Chinese border that are under Chinese influence, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Mongla group? If not, there can be no doubt that the current government and successive governments will continue fighting the MNDAA until the territories are retaken in defense of the country’s sovereignty. This is the message we wish to convey to the MNDAA, other armed groups, and their supporters regarding Myanmar’s sovereignty.

Likewise, in view of the more than 76 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries, China must respect Myanmar’s sovereignty. The Chinese government also bears primary responsibility for helping bring an end to the ethnic armed organizations operating along its border. This responsibility goes beyond merely mediating peace negotiations. President Xi Jinping needs to follow the path taken under Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, who completely cut off support for the Communist Party of Burma and set Myanmar on a course that laid the best possible foundations for peace.

President Xi Jinping and China are the key parties responsible for, and best positioned to make a decisive contribution to, achieving peace in Myanmar.

May China–Myanmar friendship endure for generations to come.

May Myanmar’s sovereignty be safeguarded and preserved for generations to come.